What is it like to make a choice? We easily give way to the temptation to think that it is always the same kind ofthing, or that there is one kind of decision making that is serious and authentic and that all other kinds ought to be like it. In the present climate, our tendency is to imagine that choices are made by something called the individual will, faced with a series of clearly different possibilities, as if we were standing in front of a supermarket shelf. There maybe disagreement as to what the "right" choice would be, but we know what making the choice is about. Perhaps for some people the right choice would be the one that best expressed their own individual and independent preference: they would be saying "no" to all attempts from outside to influence them or to determine what they should do, so that their choice would really be theirs. Others would be wondering which alternative was the one that best corresponded to a code of rules: somewhere there would be one thing they could do that would be in accord with the system, and the challenge would be to spot which one it was-though it might sometimes feel a bit like guessing which egg-cup had the coin under it in a game. In either case, however, the basic model would be the same: the will looks at the range of options and setdes for one.
But of course we do not spend our lives in supermarkets. Some of us, indeed, come from environments in which this kind of consumer choice is at best a remote dream, where it can sound like cruel mockery even to talk of such possibilities. For the rest of us-the ones who do have the power to exercise such choices-is this model really a sensible account of what it is like to make decisions in general?
Whom shall I marry? Shall I marry at all? Which charity shall I support this Christmas? Shall I resign from this political party, which is now committed to things I do not believe in-but is still better than * Rowan Williams is the Bishop of Monmouth in the Church of Wales. This paper was originally presented at a plenary session of the Lambeth Conference on July 22, 1998. It is reprinted here with the permission of the Secretary General of the Anglican Consultative Council and will be included in the official journal of the Lambeth Conference to be published by Morehouse. the other parties in some ways? Should I become a vegetarian? Should I break the law and join an anti-government protest? Should I refuse to pay my taxes when I know they are partly used to buy weapons of mass destruction? How should I finish this poem or this novel? How should I finish my life if I know I'm dying? Think about these and choices like them. Each of them-even "Which charity shall I support?"-is a decision that is colored by the sort of person I am. The choice is not made by a will operating in a vacuum but by someone who is used to thinking and imagining in a certain way-someone who is the sort of person who finds an issue like this an issue of concern (another person might not be worried in the same way by the same question). This means that an answer only in terms of the "system," the catalog of right answers, would help us not at all. What kind of code, we may ask, would give us impersonally valid solutions to the dilemmas just listed? We believe that in some contexts we can say, "You ought never to do that," but there is no straightforward equivalent formula allowing us to say, "You ought always to do that." As the Welsh philosopher Rush Rhees argues in an unpublished paper, telling someone else what he or she ought to do is as problematic as telling someone else what she or he wants. There is a significant sense in which only I can answer the question, "What ought I to do?" just as only I can answer, "What do I want?" But for me to answer either question is harder than it sounds at first. Rhees is careful to say that "What ought I to do?" is drastically different from a question about my preferences, what I happen to want (or think I want) at some specific moment. Herbert McCabe, a prominent British Roman Catholic theologian and moralist, wrote many years ago-not without a touch of mischief-that "ethics is entirely concerned with doing what you want" 1 ; he goes on to explain that our problem is that we live in a society-and indeed as part of a fallen humanity-that deceives us constandy about what we most deeply want.
The point that both Rhees and McCabe are trying to make is emphatically not that ethics is a matter of the individual s likes or dislikes, but, on the contrary, that ethics is a difficult discovering of something about yourself, a discovering of what has already shaped the person you are and is molding you in this or that direction. We might put it a bit differendy by saying that we are trying to discover what is most "natural" to us, though this begs too many questions for comfort. Rhees notes, very pertinendy, that if I say I must discover something about myself in order to make certain kinds of decisions with honesty, this is not purely "subjective": I am in pursuit of a truth that is not at my mercy, even if it is a truth about myself. And when the decision is made, I shall not at once know for certain that it is "right"-in the sense that I might know if it were a matter of performing an action in accordance with certain rules. It may be that only as years pass shall I be able to assess something I have done as the "natural" or truthful decision.
That too tells us something significant about our decision making: we may in retrospect come to believe that-however difficult a decision seemed at the time-it was the only thing we could have done. We were less free to choose than we thought: or, we might say, we were more free (in a different sense) to do what was deepest in us. Some of our problems certainly arise from a very shallow idea of what freedom means, as if it were first and foremost a matter of consumer choice, of being faced with a range of possibilities with no pressure to choose one rather than another. But we have to reckon with the freedom that comes in not being distracted from what we determine to do. Saints are often recognized by this freedom from distraction. They may not be-subjectively-eager to do what they are going to do, but they have a mature and direct discernment of what "must" be done if they are to be faithful to the truth they acknowledge. And their confidence comes not from knowing a catalog of recommended or proscribed actions, but from that knowledge of who or what they are that enables them to know what action will be an appropriate response to the truth of themselves and the world.
It is time now to look harder at this matter of self-knowledge. We can easily misunderstand it if we think first and foremost of the self as a finished and self-contained reality with its own fixed needs and dispositions. That, alas, is how the culture of the post-Enlightenment world has more and more tended to see it. We romanticize the lonely self; we are fascinated by its pathos and its drama; we explore it in literature and psychological analysis, and treat its apparent requirements with reverence. None of this is wrong-though it may be risky and a courting of fantasy-but we have to think harder, in the 'Western" or North Adantic world, about the way the self is already shaped by the relations in which it stands. Long before we can have any intel-ligent account of our "selfhood" in absolutely distinct terms, we already have identities we did not choose; others have entered into what we are-parents and neighbors, the inheritance of class and nation or tribe, all those around us who are speaking the language we are going to learn. To become a conscious self is not to say no to all this: that would be flatly impossible. It is to learn a way of making sense and communicating within an environment in which our options are already limited by what we have come into.
If this is so, self-knowledge is far more than lonely introspection. We discover who we are, in significant part, by meditating on the relations in which we already stand. We occupy a unique place in the whole network of human and other relations that makes up the world of language and culture, but that is not at all the same as saying that we possess an identity that is fundamentally quite unlike that of others and uninvolved in the life of others-an identity with its own given agenda. Thus the self-discovery we have been thinking about in the process of making certain kinds of decisions is also a discovery of the world that shapes us. I spoke earlier of finding out what has shaped the person I now am, and this is always going to be more than the history of my own previous decisions. This is where we may begin to talk theologically. How do Christians make moral decisions? In the same way as other people. That is to say, they do not automatically have more information about moral truth in the abstract than anyone else. What is different is the relations in which they are involved, the relations that shape a particular kind of reaction to their environment and to each other. If you want to say that they know more than other people, this can only be true in the sense that they are involved with more than others, with a larger reality, not that they have been given an extra set of instructions. The people of Israel in the Old Testament received the Law when God had already established relation with them, when they were already beginning to be a community bound by faithfulness to God and each other. The Law does not come into a vacuum but crystallizes what has begun to exist through the action of God.
When the Old Testament prophets announce God s judgment on the people, they do not primarily complain about the breaking of specific rules (though they can do ¿his in some contexts) or about failure to live up to a moral ideal. They denounce those actions that signify a breaking of the covenant with God and so the breaking of the bonds of faithfulness that preserve Israel as a people to whom God has given a unique vocation-they denounce, above all, actions such as idolatry and economic oppression. They denounce Israel for replacing the supremely active and transcendent God who brought them out of Egypt with local myths that allow Israel to manage and contain the divine, for creating or tolerating a social order that allows some among Gods chosen nation to be enslaved by others because of poverty, unworried by massive luxury and consumption, or for seeing its deepest safety in treaties with bloodthirsty superpowers.
If you The truth sought by such a person would be a truth shared with the community of which he was a part, the community that gave him his identity in a number of basic respects.
When we turn to the New Testament, it is striking that the earliest attempts at Christian ethical thinking echo this so closely. We can watch Saint Paul in Romans 14 and 15 or 1 Corinthians 10 discussing what was in fact a profoundly serious dilemma for his converts: to abstain from meat sacrificed to pagan gods. This was regarded as one of the minimum requirements for fidelity to the true God by Jews ofthat age (as an aspect of the covenant with Noah, which was earlier and more comprehensive than the covenant made through Moses), and this requirement was reaffirmed by the most authoritative council we know in the church's first decades, the apostolic synod described in Acts 15. But the growing recognition that the sacrifice of Christ had put all laws of ritual purity in question, combined with the practical complications of urban life in the Mediterranean cities, were obviously placing urban converts under strain.
Paul is, it seems, fighting on two fronts at once. He warns, in Romans 14, of the risks of the "pure," the ultra-conscientious, passing judgment on the less careful. At the same time he warns the less careful against causing pain to the scrupulous by flaunting their freedom in ways that provoke conflict or, worse, doubt. In the Corinthian text, he offers an even clearer theological rationale for his advice in arguing that any decision in this area should be guided by the priority of the other persons advantage and, thus, by the imperative of building the Body of Christ more securely. What will guide me is the need to show in my choices the character of the God who has called me and the character of the community to which I belong; my God is a God whose concern for all is equal; my community is one in which all individual actions are measured by how securely they build up a pattern of selfless engagement with the interest of the other-which in itself (if we link it up to what else Paul has to say) is a manifestation of the completely costly directedness to the other that is shown in God s act in Christ.
So for the early Christian, as for the Jew, the self that must be discovered is a self already involved very specifically in this kind of community, in relation to this kind of God (the God of self-emptying). The goal of our decision making is to show what God s selfless attention might mean in prosaic matters of everyday life-but also to show Gods glory (look, for example, at Romans 15:7 or 1 Corinthians 10: 31). What am I to do? I am to act in such a way that my action becomes something given into the life of the community and in such a way that what results is glory-the radiating, the visibility, of God s beauty in the world. The self that I am, the self that I have been made to be, is the self engaged by God in love and now in process of recreation through the community of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit.
It is no use trying to answer the question about who I really am independendy of this. There is no secret, detached, individual ego apart from these realities in which I am gracefully entangled. So perhaps the most important challenge to some of our conventional Western ways of talking about morality comes from the biblical principle that sees ethics as essentially part of our reflection on the nature of the Body of Christ.
What might this mean in more depth? The model of action which actively and without qualification promotes the good of the other is depicted by Paul. It reflects the self-emptying of God in Christ. It presupposes that every action of the believer is in some sense designed as a gift to the Body. Gifts are, by definition, not what has been demanded, not the payment of a debt or the discharging of a duty. To borrow the terms of one of our most distinguished Anglican thinkers, John Milbank, a gift cannot just be a "repetition" of what is already there. At the same time, a gift has its place within a network of activities; it is prompted by a relationship and it affects that relationship and others; it may in its turn prompt further giving. In this context, however, it is important that a gift be the sort ofthing that can be received, the sort ofthing it makes sense to receive, something recognizable within the symbolic economy of the community, something that speaks the language of the community. In the Christian context, what this means is that an action offered as gift to the life of the Body must be recognizable as an action that in some way or another manifests the character of the God who has called the community.
This discernment is where the pain and tension arises of Christian disagreement over moral questions. Decisions are made after some struggle and reflection, after some serious effort to discover what it means to be in Christ; they are made by people who are happy to make themselves accountable, in prayer and discussion and spiritual direction. Yet their decisions may be regarded by others as impossible to receive as a gift that speaks of Christ-by others who seek no less rigorously to become aware of who they are in Christ and who are equally concerned to be accountable for their Christian options. It would be simpler to resolve these matters if we were more abstract in our Christian learning and growing, but the truth is that we learn our faith in incarnate ways. Christ makes sense to us because of the specific Christian relationships in which we are involved-this community, this inspirational pastor or teacher, this experience of reading scripture with others. Of course (it ought not to need saying) such particularities are always challenged and summoned to move into the universal sphere, the catholic mind of the whole body. But this can be a struggle.
If we learn our discipleship in specific contexts and relations, as we are bound to, our Christian identity will never be an abstract matter. We are slowly coming to acknowledge the role of cultural specificities in our Christian practice. It is more than that, though, more than a matter of vague cultural relativity, let alone allowing the surrounding culture to dictate our priorities. It is that local Christian communities gradually and subdy come to take for granted slightly different things, to speak of God with a marked local accent. At a fairly simple level, we might think of different attitudes to the Christian use of alcohol in many African contexts as opposed to prevailing assumptions in Europe and North America, or we might consider differences as to whom you might most immediately ask for help regarding matters of moral or even spiritual concern-a cleric, an elder in a community, or a family council. At first sight, when you encounter a different "accent," it can sound as though the whole of your Christian world is under attack, or at least under question, precisely because no one learns Christianity without a local accent.
All of this would be easy to resolve if we did not care about Christian consistency-if we did not somehow share a conviction that the church ought to speak coherendy to its environment about discerning the difference between ways that lead to life and ways that lead to death. We want our faith to be more than just what we learn from those with whom we are familiar and instinctively trust because we remember-or we should remember-how the faith moved out from the familiar territory of the eastern Mediterranean to become "naturalized" in other cultures. Tribalism is never enough. Yet when we begin to put our insights together, deep and sometimes agonizing conflict appears. What are we to do?
So much is being said at present about issues of sexuality that I believe it is important to look seriously at some other matters when we reflect on moral decision making and the character of our moral discernment. So let me take a different set of questions, one in which I have long been involved. I believe that it is impossible for a Christian to tolerate, let alone bless or defend, the manufacture and retention of weapons of mass destruction by any political authority. Having said that I believe it is impossible, I at once have to recognize that Christians do it-not thoughdess, shallow, uninstructed Christians, but precisely those who make themselves accountable to the central truths of our faith in the ways I have described. I cannot at times believe that we are reading the same Bible; I cannot understand what it is that could conceivably speak of the nature of the Body of Christ in any defense of such strategy. These are people I meet at the Lord s Table. I know they hear the scriptures I hear, and I am aware that they offer their discernment as a gift to the Body.
At its most impressive, the kind of argument developed in defense of their stance reminds me that in a violent world the question of how we take responsibility for each other, how we avoid a bland and uncostìy withdrawal from the realities of our environment, is not easily or quickly setded. In this argument, I hear something I need to hear-something that, left to myself, I might not grasp. So I am left in perplexity. I cannot grasp how this reading of the Bible is possible. I want to go on arguing against it with all my powers, and I believe the Christian witness in the world is weakened by our failure to speak with one voice on the matter. Yet it seems I am forced to ask what there is in this position that I might recognize as a gift, as a showing of Christ.
It comes-for me-so near the edge of what makes any sense to me. I have to ask whether there is any point at which my inability to recognize anything of gift in another's policy, another's discernment, that might make it a nonsense to pretend to stay in the same communion. It is finely balanced. I am not a Mennonite or a Quaker. I can dimly see that the intention of my colleagues who see differendy is also a kind of obedience, by their lights, to what we are all trying to discern. I see in them the signs of struggling with God's Word and with the nature of Christ's Body. Sixty years ago, Bonhoeffer and others broke the fragile communion of the German Protestant churches over the issue of the anti-Jewish legislation of the Third Reich, convinced that this so cut at the heart of any imaginable notion of what Christ's Body might mean that it could only be empty to pretend that the same faith was still shared. Getting to such a recognition is perhaps harder than some enthusiasts imagine, and Bonhoeffer has wise words about the dangers of deciding well in advance where the non-negotiable boundaries lie. Our task is rather to work at becoming a discerning community, ready to recognize a limit when it appears, a limit that will have a perfecdy concrete and immediate character. For Bonhoeffer, the limits were going to be set "from outside": "the boundaries are drawn arbitrarily by the world, which shuts itself off from the Church by not hearing and believing." 2 Of course the discernment of such boundaries has quite properly involved the church in drawing boundaries "from within" in the form of baptism and credal confession. To paraphrase Bonhoeffer, if we did not have these markers of Christian identity, there would be no ground on which the Church as a community, a body with a common language, could discuss and discern a possible boundary being set by the world's refusal of the gospel.
The question is, When and where does the "world" so invade the church that the fundamental nature of the church is destroyed? To this question there is-by definition, Bonhoeffer would say-no general and abstract answer. Up to a certain point we struggle to keep the conversation alive, as long as we can recognize that our partners in this conversation are speaking the same language, wresding with the same given data of faith. If I might put it in a formula that may sound too much like jargon, I suggest that what we are looking for in each other "is the grammar of obedience: we watch to see if our partners take the same kind of time, sense that they are under the same sort of judgment or scrutiny, and approach the issue with the same attempt to be dispossessed by the truth with which they are engaging. This will not guarantee agreement, but it might explain why we should always first be hesitant and attentive to each other. Why might anyone think this person s view of the question might count as a gift of Christ to the Church? To answer that, I have a great deal of listening to do, even if my incomprehension remains.
There is a further turn to this. When I continue reluctandy to share the Church's communion with someone with whose moral judgment I deeply disagree, I do so in the knowledge that for both of us part of the cost is that we have to sacrifice a straightforward confidence in our "purity." Being in the Body means that we are touched by one another's commitments and thus by one another's failures. If another Christian comes to a different conclusion and decides in different ways from myself, and if I can still recognize his or her discipline and practice as sufficiendy like mine to sustain a conversation, this leaves my own decisions to some extent under question. I cannot have absolute certainty that this is the only imaginable reading of the tradition. I need to keep my reflections under critical review. This, I must emphasize, is not a form of relativism. It is a recognition of the element of putting oneself at risk that is involved in any serious decision making or any serious exercise of discernment (as any pastor or confessor will know). But this is only part of the implication of recognizing the differences and risks of decision making in the Body of Christ.
If I conclude that my Christian brothers or sisters are deeply and damagingly mistaken in their decisions, I accept for myself the brokenness in the Body that this entails. These are my wounds, just as those who disagree with me are wounded by what they consider to be my failure or even betrayal. So long as we still have a language in common and the "grammar of obedience" in common, we have, I believe, to turn away from the temptation to seek the purity and assurance of a community speaking with only one voice and to embrace the reality of living in a communion that is fallible and divided. The communion s need for health and mercy is inseparable from my own need for health and mercy. To remain in communion is to remain in solidarity with those who are wounded as well as wounding the Church, in the trust that within the Body of Christ the confronting of wounds is part of opening ourselves to healing. This is hard to express. It may be clearer if we think for a moment of the past of our Church. In the Body of Christ, I am in communion with past Christians whom I regard as profoundly and damagingly in error-with those who justified slavery, torture, or the execution of heretics. They justified these things on the basis of the same Bible as the one I read, and they were people who prayed-probably more intensely than I ever shall. How do I relate to them? How much easier it would be if I did not have to acknowledge that they are part of my community, that they share in the life I share; that the consequences they drew are consequences that may be drawn from the faith I hold along with them. I do not seek simply to condemn them but to stand alongside them in my own prayer not knowing how, in the strange economy of the Body, their life and mine may work together for our common salvation. I do not think for a moment that they are right on matters such as those I have mentioned, but I acknowledge that they "knew" what their own concrete Christian communities taught them to know, just as I "know" what I have learned in the same concrete and particular way. When I stand in God's presence or at the Lord s Table, they are part of the company to which I belong.
Living in the Body of Christ is, in fact, hard work. Modern liberals are embarrassed by belonging to a community whose history is infected by prejudice and cruelty (and so they often try to sanitize this history or silence it or distance themselves from it). Modern traditionalists are embarrassed by belonging to a community whose present is muddled, secularized, and fragmented (and they long for a renewed and purified Church where there are apparently clear rules for the making of moral decisions). If we cared less about the truth and objectivity of our moral commitments, all this would matter much less. When I say that our moral decisions involve a risk, I do not mean to suggest that they have nothing to do with truth. They are risky precisely because we are trying to hear the truth-and to show the truth, the truth of God's character as uniquely revealed in Jesus Christ. There are times when the risky decision called for is to recognize that we are no longer speaking the same language at all, no longer seeking to mean the same things, to symbolize or communicate the same vision of who God is. But that moment itself only emerges from the con-standy self-critical struggle to find out who I am and who we are in and as the Body of Christ.
Can we then begin thinking about our ethical conflicts in terms of our understanding of the Body of Christ? The first implication, as I have suggested, has to do with how we actually decide what we are to do, what standard toward which we should appeal. An ethic of the Body of Christ asks that we first examine how any proposed action or any proposed style or policy of action measures up to two concerns. How does it manifest the selfless holiness of God in Christ? And how can it serve as a gift that builds up the community called to show that holiness in its corporate life?
What I have to discover as I try to form my mind and will is the nature of my pre-existing relation with God and with those others whom God has touched, with whom I share a life of listening for God and praising God. Self-discovery, yes, but also the discovery of a self already shaped by these relations and these consequent responsibilities. Then, if I am serious about making a gift of what I do to the Body as a whole, I have to struggle to make sense of my decision in terms of the common language of the faith, to demonstrate why this might be a way of speaking the language of the historic schema of Christian belief.
This process involves self-criticism and self-questioning in the presence of scripture and tradition, as well as engagement with the wider community of believers. Equally, if I want to argue that something hitherto not problematic in Christian practice or discourse can no longer be regarded in this light, I have a comparable theological job in demonstrating why it cannot be a possible move on the basis of the shared commitments of the Church. I may understand at least in part why earlier generations considered slavery as compatible with the gospel or why they regarded any order of government other than monarchy to be incompatible with the gospel. I may thus see something of what Christ meant to them, and receive something of Christ from them, even as I conclude that they were dangerously deluded in their belief about what was involved in serving Christ.
I cannot escape the obligation of looking and listening for Christ in the acts of another Christian who is manifestly engaged, self-critically engaged, with the data of common belief and worship. As I have hinted, though, there are points when recognition fails. If someone no longer expressly brings acts and projects before the criterion we look to together; if someone's conception of the Body of Christ is ultimate-ly deficient, a conception only of a human society (that is, if they have no discernible commitment to the risen Christ and the Spirit as active in the Church); if their actions systematically undermine the unconditionality of the gospel's offer (this was why justification by faith became the point of division for the Reformation churches and why the anti-Jewish laws of the Third Reich became the point of division for the Confessing Church in 1935)-then the question arises of whether there is any reality left in maintaining communion. This is a serious matter on which generalizations are useless. All we can do is be wary of self-dramatization, wary of broad-brush rhetoric about the abandonment of "standards." As the Confessing Church knew well, such a case requires detailed argument-and the sense also that a decision is being forced upon us, that we are being encountered by a limitation on the unconditionality of the gospel's offer rather than our own enunciation in advance of a principle that will legitimate the creation of divisions.
Unity at all costs is indeed not a Christian goal. Our unity is Christ-shaped or it is empty. Yet our first call, so long as we can think of ourselves as still speaking the same language, is to stay in engagement with those who decide differendy. This, I have suggested, means living with the awareness that the Church and I, as a part of it, share not only in grace but in failure, and thus we stay alongside those on the other side, in the hope that we may still be exchanging gifts-the gift of Christ-in some ways, for one another's healing.
One of our problems, especially in our media-conscious age, is that we talk past each other and in each other's absence. Even when we speak face to face, it is often in a "lock" of mutual suspicion and deep anxiety. The Body of Christ, however, requires more of us. It requires staying alongside: this requirement implies that the most profound service we can do for each other is to point to Christ; to turn from our confrontation in silence to the Christ at whom we all tiy to look; to say to one another from time to time, hopefully and gendy, "Do you see that? This is how I see him; can you see too?" For many of us, the experience of ecumenical encounter is like this when it is doing its work. I wonder whether we are capable of a similar way of working when we divide over moral questions. It does not preclude our saying in an ecumenical context, "I can't see that; that sounds like error to me," and in an ethical context, "I can't see that; that sounds like sin to me." That, as I have noted, is what I want to say to those who defend certain kinds of defense policies. But what
